

Affirmative Action and Inequalities: Theoretical Slip and the Nigerian Lapses

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Does affirmative action bridge inequalities? If yes, why has the policy persisted and become permanent in societies that have adopted it? This paper attempts to answer this question in the Nigerian context where the policy was driven by horizontal educational imbalance during the terminal phase of colonialism. Drawing on Ronald Dworkin's resource egalitarian theory that defends affirmative action especially in university admissions, it argues that the policy has been successful in terms of bridging political inequalities; however, inequalities persist in the very educational sector that drove the policy in 1954. The paper locates the source of the imbalance in the apparent lack of attention to disparities at the levels of primary and secondary education. Using this empirical lapse, the paper highlights a shortcoming in the philosophical argument: namely, the failure to grapple with imbalances at the lower levels of education. The conclusion is that one could only begin to contemplate the disappearance of affirmative action if its main driving force is first addressed head-on.

Affirmative action is a highly contentious policy, yet some countries have adopted and maintained it for decades. India adopted it at the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan initiated it in 1949, Sri Lanka started it in 1971, and Malaysia also in 1971. In the United States it evolved incrementally following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and in New Zealand it was introduced with the Human Rights Commission Act of 1977. In most, if not all these cases, the policy was to enable groups “catch up,” yet it has persisted for four to seven decades since it was introduced. Does affirmative action bridge inequalities? If yes, why has the policy persisted and become permanent in societies that have adopted it? In their empirical study of race preference admissions into leading colleges and universities in the United States, William Bowen and Derek Bok (1998) argued that the policy has enabled the production of a professional class who have become “the backbone of the emergent black middle class.” However, they warned that ending the policy would lead to severe setback for African Americans. It is a puzzle why there will be a severe setback when the policy has been operational for about half a century. Under what condition would the policy bridge inequality so that the socially disadvantaged can no longer be regarded as disadvantage?

I will attempt to address the question by interrogating Ronald Dworkin’s theoretical arguments for affirmative action, especially with regards to university admissions. His arguments seek to create an egalitarian society in which people have fair distribution of resources so they can make choices about the lives they want to live. In brief, Dworkin (2000; 1985; 1981; 1977) tries to bridge inequality arising from bad fate that befalls persons, bad fate that is outside their control. His view is that to lack talent or to be handicapped is bad fate; it is not a choice that people make, and no one should be responsible for the disadvantages it causes in the competitive world. To mitigate inequalities that it generates, he prescribes affirmative action entailing preference university admission for the socially disadvantaged. This mode of bridging inequalities “respects the rights of all members of the community to be treated as equal” (Dworkin, 1977:239). He also notes that the justification has a forward-looking dimension: it makes for diversity in institutions and the community is better off (Dworkin, 2000). Dworkin (2000:408) substantiated his principled argument by drawing heavily on the earlier referenced Bowen and Bok’s *The Shape of the River* empirical study. He declares that affirmative action is “impressively successful” at bridging inequalities and making the society better off.

I accept the view that the affirmative action is consistent with liberal justice and has the potential to bridge inequalities. Following Brown, Langer, & Stewart (2012), and Stewart (2009) I note that it makes for political inclusion of groups; however, I query the philosophical literature for the persistence of horizontal imbalances in education where the policy has been applied for decades. My principal claim is that the theoretical prescription for reducing educational imbalances focuses heavily on university admissions, and that primary and secondary education that supplies the imbalance is unattended to. I develop this claim using Nigeria as a case study.

There are good reasons for dwelling on Africa’s most populous and multinational federation. First, the policy was primarily in response to horizontal educational disparities, the very disparities that

Dworkin sought to address in his theory and which was also the focus of Bowen and Bok's study. Secondly, Nigeria's educational inequality is not the result of historical injustice or oppressive behaviour of one group towards another; rather, it was partly the result of how early or late a community came into contact with colonial Christian missionary educators, and partly the outcome of differential responses by communities to the educators. Dworkin's egalitarian arguments that treat the untalented with equal concern seem to fit the Nigerian context where some ethno-regional communities, including some in the south, were severely disadvantaged in the skills required to function in the newly emerging political economy. Thirdly, the country's policy is among the earliest in the world, perhaps the third after India and Pakistan. It evolved incrementally from 1954 when the country was in the terminal phase of British colonialism. Over six to seven decades later, it is still ongoing without any indication that the educational imbalance that propelled it is being bridged. The paper locates the enduring imbalance in the apparent lack of attention, by both theory and practice, to disparities at the levels of primary and secondary education.

The work proceeds by first spelling out the philosophical argument for affirmative action and claims about its effectiveness. Next, it discusses the Nigerian brand, emphasizing ways in which it has been successful and ways in which it has been ineffective at solving the problem that brought it into being. The final section uses the case information to assess the theoretical argument.

Theoretical Arguments for Affirmative Action and its Effectiveness

Affirmative action is a generic word for a variety of policies that distribute social goods with the aim of facilitating the inclusion of previously excluded groups, who could be minority or majority groups. The policies often involve the use of set-asides, preferences, and quota programs in public institutions and sometimes in corporations operating in the competitive market. They fall within the domain of distributive justice; meaning principles that offer normative guide for a just distribution of goods in society. The principles for allocating goods vary remarkably, but the interest here is on that of equality. The reason is that equality is the centrepiece of liberal theory and a widespread ideal even in non-Western societies, including Nigeria, where the constitution declares: "The State social order is founded on ideals of Freedom, Equality and Justice" and "every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law" (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Section 17 subsections 1&2). Theoretically, there is the consensus among liberals that individuals are the subject of equality and social differences cannot be relevant moral grounds for treating people. Treating people equally in the distribution of social goods does not mean sharing resources equally; it means treating individuals similarly in the allocation of goods and any departure must be justified by moral persuasive argument (Rosenfeld, 1985). Dworkin provided a justification that involved showing equal concern and respect to every member of society. His account is a resource egalitarian theory that required people to be compensated if, in the free market, they suffer disadvantages that are not of their own choosing.

Dworkin spelled out an egalitarian resource allocation theory by imagining people in a desert island possessing equal purchasing power, bidding in a massive auction for the island's social

goods. The social goods are whatever the people need to live their lives – say teaching, medicine, entertainment, sports etc. Each person commits herself the moment she bids and is responsible for her choices. He claims, controversially, that the auction will pass the envy test because no one will prefer the other person's goods to her own. In his view, the auction would make for an equal division because each got what she wanted, and no one would be "envious of the other's purchases" (Dworkin, 1981:287). What bothers him is inequality that is likely to arise after his assumed initial equal distribution.

He argues that post-auction, inequality will arise because some people will opt for leisure while some will choose the life of hard work. In the Dworkinian scheme, those who chose industrious life are entitled to the fruit of their labour while those who live leisurely also reap the outcome. It is not unjust if inequality arises from the choices people make. However, there is injustice if inequality arises from uncontrollable background conditions such as talent and being handicapped. People are not equal in terms of these background conditions which the market rewards differently. Being endowed with natural talents and not being handicapped is like winning a chance lottery. Those who possess them will earn higher incomes while those who do not, have brute bad luck and will likely be poor.

In his classic work, John Rawls (1971) confronted this problem of differences in talents and endowments that make some people to be well-off than others. He responded with the difference principle: inequality is not justified unless it improves the wellbeing of the disadvantaged members of society. Dworkin took a different track by calling for redistribution of the wealth generated by talent. In his view, no one chooses to have brute bad luck and should not be responsible for its outcome. Innate talent is unmerited, and no one is entitled to the wealth it produces. People are only responsible for the outcome of "option luck", that is, the gambles they deliberately make (1981:293). They only merit wealth generated by the hard work they chose to do. Economic inequalities arising from it are, therefore, justified while those arising from unmerited skills and capacities are not. He tweaks the imaginary auction to include a hypothetical insurance market in which participants purchase compulsory insurance against the possibility of having brute bad luck. This translates into affirmative action in education for the untalented.

What emerges from Dworkin's defense of affirmative action is his rejection of merit as the basis for distributing goods. By his account, a person who has talent for soccer or for invention is not entitled to the wealth it generates, only the part produced by hard work. Mitigating economic inequalities arising thereof invites political intervention in the market with a view to redistributing wealth generated by talent. This is not a criticism that I wish to pursue. Instead my interest is in his wrong assumption that the initial distribution of goods among his desert islanders would be envy-free. He forgot that there is something called buyer's remorse – the feeling of regret after purchasing an item. The idea that the auction would make for equal division is pure fiction, as some would immediately be unhappy with their purchase and instantly envy what others have. Dworkin glossed over inequality at this first stage of his theory, an inequality that has the potential

to undermine his prescription for remedying inequality generated in the second stage by brute bad luck. This paper elaborates on this claim in the sections below.

In other instances, Dworkin (2000; 1977) has made forward-looking justification that makes the community as a whole better off, not backward-looking arguments that seek to compensate individuals or groups who may not have been victims of past injustice. His forward-looking arguments are both utilitarian and ideal. Utilitarian arguments, according to him, posit that “the average or collective level of welfare in the community is improved even though the welfare of some individuals falls,” while ideal arguments maintain that the community is “more just, or in some other way closer to an ideal society, whether or not average welfare is improved” (Dworkin, 1977: 232). Writing with specific reference to the United States where blacks were excluded from admission into the University of Texas Law School in the 1940s (*Sweatt v. Painter*) on grounds of segregation but favoured at the University of Washington Law School (*DeFunis v. Odegaard*) in the 1970s on grounds of affirmative action, he argued that both utilitarian and ideal arguments would justify the latter and not the former. The utilitarian argument is that, “increasing the number of black lawyers reduces racial tension, which in turn improves the welfare of everyone,” while the ideal argument is that whatever the effects on average welfare, preference admission for the disadvantaged blacks makes the community more equal and therefore more just” (Dworkin, 1977: 232). Both arguments cannot be invoked to justify segregation.

In one of his last main publications, Dworkin (2000) has a chapter entitled Affirmative Action: Does it Work? He answered his question by extensively citing Bowen and Bok’s (1998) study which showed that race-sensitive admission policies diversified the student body in 28 leading American colleges and produced a solid professional class who contribute meaningfully to society. In his view, affirmative action works and “it will be wrong for the nation to prohibit the policy now” (2000:408). I do not object that affirmative action produces a solid middle class; instead I have difficulties with the policy’s inability to narrow disparities after several decades of operation. I explore this view using case information from Nigeria.

The Nigerian Specifics

This history of affirmative action in Nigeria has been extensively documented and need not be rehearsed (Sowell, 2004; Mustapha, 2009; Gboyega, 1989). Suffice to state that the policy emerged in the context of unequal educational skills required to function in the political economy of late-colonial and early post-colonial Nigeria. It started when the internally self-governing regions began to discriminate against non-indigenes with regards to civil service employments, progressed to the federal government targeting the North in terms of recruitment into the national bureaucracy and provision of educational programs, and evolved to the use of quota for recruitment and promotion in the military in 1962 (Sklar, 2004; Gboyega, 1989; Dudley, 1973). Although quota contributed to Nigeria’s first military coup of 1966 and was abandoned prior to the outbreak of the Biafran civil war of 1967-70, post-civil war Nigerian military governments adopted the “informal proportionality principle” for appointments into public offices and for allocating infrastructural

projects (Rothchild, 1997:51 & 66). This explains the uneconomical location of government industrial and commercial projects, including an oil refinery in an area where no crude oil exists (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1987). It also motivated federal declaration of ownership right over oil resources and the distribution of revenues derived thereof among the successor states to the old regions. The informal proportionality principle morphed into the federal character principle in 1979, a full-blown affirmative action law that has three core elements:

- a) blunting the relevance of ethnicity by progressively reorganizing the country into 36 states and using geographic landmarks, historical kingdoms, and colonial administrative divisions to name these states. Government verbally denied the use of ethnicity in drawing the internal boundaries but, in practice, ethnic lines were followed very closely, and membership of the state and local governments was legally defined in terms of autochthony (See Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, section 318). Frank de Zwart (2005:140) has referred to the deliberate use of political/administrative constructs instead of ethnic groups as the targets of redistribution as a “replacement” strategy. I would rather refer to it as a masking or veiling strategy.
- b) vesting the central government with ownership right to oil resources and the legal requirement that the benefits be redistributed among the political/administrative veils.
- c) the requirement that appointments into positions at federal, state, and local government institutions should reflect the diversity of populations within the territorial jurisdiction of each of the tiers of government. This element has been applied to all federal institutions including those in the educational sector. To ensure that highly limited top national positions are equitably distributed, the country was informally divided into six geo-cultural zones -- North East, North Central, North West, South East, South-South, and South West -- in 1996.

One could make the case that federal character has been successful in some respects. Nigeria’s overall policy objective was to avoid political domination of national institutions by a single geographic cluster of groups or a combination of two large groups. This has been achieved in two ways.

The statutory sharing of oil revenues derived mainly from the ethnic minorities’ South-South zone has provided all the governments with some financial security and enabled the federation to remain intact. The distributive arrangement has enabled Nigeria to avoid what would have been an unusual asymmetrical ethno-federation in which the few oil-producing ethnic minority states possess enormous financial power that would have potentially made them creditors to the have-not states. The federation avoided a potentially deep dichotomy between extremely-rich and extremely-poor constituent units, disparity that would have made the ethnic minority states economically powerful enough to dominate the federation. In this sense, I dissent with Thomas Sowell’s (2004:105) idea that “the government of Nigeria has served as an instrument for milking one ethnic group for the benefit of another.”

Secondly, there has been a remarkable degree of political inclusion. Both majority and minority groups have been accommodated in internal self-governing units. National offices have been equitably distributed among groups, and leaders who tried to be sectional have been compelled by federal character to diversify their appointments. Indeed, the distribution of 551 major federal positions in 2013 showed that the three zones in the North and the three zones in the South were nearly equal as they had 273 and 274 positions respectively (Table 1). The northern minorities (North Central zone) and southern minorities (South South zone) were best represented in the country's top political positions (Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, 2013). Unlike the pre-1967 era, we no longer have 'minorities expressed fears of domination' and 'ways of allaying them', neither do the majority groups have the capacity to secede as each has been dispersed in several states. The goal of national unity may not have been advanced as Thomas Sowell has argued, but horizontal political inequality has been rectified and the political community is more just compared to the past. Indeed, as far back as 1987, a government commission that was established to coordinate a national political debate noted that a broad section of the Nigerian public "lauded the principle of federal character" (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1987:199).

Despite these accomplishments, horizontal inequality persists outside political appointments and representation. Imbalances are most pronounced in the educational sector where the north-south gap remains unassailable (Table 2). With a larger geographic size, numerically dominant population, and greater units of government, northern Nigeria in 1980/81 supplied only 29.6 percent of fresh university students; three decades later, in 2011, the number declined to 26.3 percent before rising to 38 per cent in 2015. The rest of the country supplied 70 per cent of fresh students in 1980/81, 74.05 per cent in 2011 and 64.63 per cent in 2015. Educationally disadvantaged Bayelsa State in the South-South also has trouble supplying fresh university students. Even though the state governments have constitutional authority to build schools and educate their own populations, northern Nigeria is unable to bridge the gap with the rest of the country. In 2015, the seventeen southern states had twice as much as the nineteen northern states in the number of applicants for post-secondary admissions; in fact, nine of the nineteen northern states accounted for only 7.25 percent of candidates for post-secondary admissions, equivalent to the number posted by one southern state: Imo (Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board, 2016). Over six decades since political leaders in the north expressed fears about the region being unable to compete with the more educated south in filling positions in the national service, the educational gap remains wide.

The enduring educational gap is reflected in the imbalance in the highest levels of the federal bureaucracy (Table 3). Data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (2016) show that in 2011 all the geopolitical zones in the country, except two, were nearly equally represented in the top echelons of the federal civil service. The two were the North East and North West, whose combined representation was half that of the neighbouring North Central zone and about half each

of the three southern zones. The best performing North Central is the middle belt that is predominantly non-Muslim. Minus this zone, affirmative action has had little effect.

The Insights of Nigeria's Federal Character

The preceding practical information about Nigeria helps to shed some insights into the theoretical arguments for affirmative action.

One of the main theoretical justifications for affirmative action was that talent or skill is arbitrarily endowed and inequalities arising from it is not defensible. Since merit is not earned and therefore not a legitimate criterion for laying claims to a greater share of resources, society could use any criteria, including ethnic category, to allocate goods including college admissions. This argument is expressed by the Nigerian case, where university admissions are based on three weighted variables: merit (45%), locality (35%), and educationally less developed states (20%). The use of this mix of variables, not strictly merit, treats the disadvantaged with equal concern.

Yet the states in Nigeria's northeast and northwest (with exception of Kano and Kaduna) are under represented in university enrollment. This is puzzling. The most recent data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics show that the northern and southern states are nearly equal in secondary school enrollment. In fact, Nasarawa and Jigawa, both in the north, had the highest enrolment numbers of 574,796 and 461,087 respectively in 2014 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016:128). Yet university student's enrolment imbalance endures. The answer to the puzzle is in the annual results of the West African School Certificate Examinations. About eight to nine northern states regularly rank at the bottom. In Yobe State a total of 15,773 students sat for the examination in 2010, but only 131 passed the minimum of five credits. In Jigawa State 425 of 12,289 students passed the minimum five credits, and in Gombe 143 of 8,453 passed. Comparatively 18,284 of 32,172 passed in Abia State, and 14,065 of 38,705 passed in Delta State (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016:137). The results suggest that several of the northern states are not producing quality secondary school graduates, and that even with quota, university officials have trouble finding admissible applicants from the north.

This problem points to a major difficulty in the theoretical argument for affirmative action. Dworkin's principled argument required that the disadvantaged be treated with equal concern, using preference. However, the case at hand shows that even where preference is used, secondary schools may not supply admissible students. In 2014, the Nigerian Chibok school girls were reportedly preparing for their West African Examination Council examination when they were abducted, but after their release two correspondents in Abuja reported that "most of the... girls can hardly speak English" (Olu & Indahi, 2017). Dworkin's argument skipped over educational inequality at the primary and secondary levels. He wrongly assumed that educational horizontal inequalities at the lower levels could simply be rectified with preference admission at the higher levels. Addressing the specific case of the United States, Dworkin used data in *The Shape of the*

River study to show that blacks admitted into select colleges and universities on race sensitive admissions were academically qualified, and that the difference between black and white applicants was that the latter, as a group, was “spectacularly well qualified” (Dworkin, 2000:391). The Nigeria case does not fully support this view.

Second, the case information draws attention to a flaw in the theoretical argument for resource distribution, a flaw that makes the theory to ignore inequality at the early stages of education. Dworkin assumed that his hypothetical auction of goods among people in the desert island will make for initial equal distribution. In his view, the distribution will pass the envy test because people having the same purchasing power would each bid what she wants. This is a faulty assumption that does not account for buyer’s remorse. In real life people make purchases only to regret minutes later. At the auction, regretting what one has just purchased would make people to envy others’ goods, setting off inequality. Dworkin glossed over potential inequalities at the initial distribution and then proceeded to dwell on inequalities that occur post-auction. Perhaps this theoretical slip is reflected in his prescription that focuses on university admissions, while pay lip service to inequalities at the initial stages of education. Just as lack of attention to inequalities at lower levels of education in Nigeria defeats the country’s attempt at bridging inequalities at the university level, so lack of attention to inequalities at the first stage of resource distribution argument undermines the effectiveness of his affirmative prescription for the inequalities.

Conclusions

How then should inequality at the lower levels of education be addressed so that affirmative action at the higher levels can be more effective? Perhaps one approach is to extend the policy downwards by requiring teachers to do affirmative action grading in primary and secondary schools. This obtained in Sri Lanka where Tamil graders were suspected to be awarding higher marks to Tamil pupils, a suspicion that led to the 1971 policy of ethnic weighting of grades (Horowitz, 1985). In India, the Central Board of Secondary Education had the policy awarding “grace marks” - extra marks - to pupils in order to improve their results. The policy was put in place 1992 and lasted until 1997 when it was formally ended. This is not a reasonable approach, as it would further degrade an already battered educational system.

Perhaps a better approach is to adopt the Canadian model. The country has 100% net enrolment rate in primary schools and 91.77% to 99.65% rate in secondary schools. It accomplished this by being tough on parents. At the close of the 19th century, the country had 70% of its population in the rural areas. The demands of the farm made parents to send their children to school every alternate week. According to one study, in 1900 the daily attendance among enrolled pupils was 61% (Oreopoulos, 2006:8). The official response was the progressive introduction of compulsory school laws, starting with Ontario in 1871, British Columbia in 1873, and Prince Edward Island in 1877). The laws progressively increased the number of weeks children must be in school and the age of children to whom it applied. They stipulated penalties for parents who failed to comply and

for employers engaging children during school hours. After 1965, all the provinces enforced minimum schooling age of 15 to 16 years, the exception being Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick where the compulsory age is 18. The compulsory education laws were reinforced with child labour laws at the beginning of the 20th century (Oreopoulos, 2006). The labour laws placed a limit on the age and hours a child could work. The strict implementation and enforcement of these compulsory education and child labour laws is what makes the country to post the best school enrolment records in the industrialized world. The country did not have to apply quota to university admissions, as horizontal disparities are marginal at the lower levels of education.

Nigeria might benefit from such approach. Admittedly, there is the Compulsory, Free Universal Basic Education Act of 2004, but its provisions are basic, vague, missing core elements, and focuses excessively on the establishment of boards and their memberships. Fifteen years after the Act was enacted, there is no recorded case of a parent being convicted for violating Section 2 subsection 2 of the Act. Sokoto State had a primary school-age population of 1.1 million in 2010, but only 55.5% were enrolled, well below the sub-Saharan African average of 78% (Ministry of Education, 2010: 5 & 8). Worse still, the government that passed the Act seemed ill-prepared as schools barely exist in some areas. In Sokoto State, one of the 23 local government areas - Gudu Local Government - did not have a single secondary school until 2016 when one was built. Nigeria will have to retool if it must bridge horizontal inequalities in education. Similarly, the philosophical argument needs to be revisited.

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TABLES

Table1: Distribution of 551 Major Federal Positions, 2013

Zones	Number of Positions	Zones	Number of Positions
North Central	100	South East	80
Benue 19, Niger 11, Kogi 26, Kwara 22, Nassarawa 10, Plateau 12		Abia 16, Anambra 25, Ebonyi 6,	
		Enugu 13, Imo 20	
North East	76	South South	106
Adamawa 20, Bauchi 14, Borno 14, Gombe 13,		Akwa Ibom 12, Bayelsa 17, Cross River 11,	
Taraba 6, Yobe 9		Delta 27, Edo 23, Rivers 16	
North West	97	South West	88
Jigawa 9, Kano 20, Katsina 21, Kebbi 14, Kaduna 21,		Ekiti 10, Lagos 8, Ogun 22, Ondo 14,	
Zamfara 5, Sokoto 7		Osun 24, Oyo 10	
Federal Capital Territory	4		
Total for the Northern Zones	273	Total for the Southern Zones	274

Source: Calculated from Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (2013)

Table 2: University Admissions 2011 & 2015

	2011		2015		2015	
	Total Admissions	Percentage	Applications to Post-Secondary Institutions	Percentage	Total University Admissions	Percentage
Northern States	25,717	26.30	487,907	34.17	158,044	38.04
Adamawa	2,220	2.27	15,205	1.065	6,566	1.58
Bauchi	1,095	1.12	15,420	1.06	6,423	1.55
Benue	4,594	4.70	59,396	4.14	17,558	4.23
Borno	653	0.67	14,243	1.00	5,850	1.41
Gombe	1,024	1.05	18,201	1.27	7,143	1.72
Jigawa	374	0.38	12,071	0.85	5,351	1.29
Kaduna	2,654	2.71	48,611	3.40	16,135	3.88
Kano	712	0.73	47,454	3.23	17,321	4.17
Katsina	1,679	1.72	22,133	1.55	7,663	1.84
Kebbi	595	0.61	8,772	0.62	3,354	0.81
Kogi	2,248	2.30	56,673	3.97	16,282	3.92
Kwara	2,476	2.53	52,436	3.67	13,626	3.28
Nasarawa	1,011	1.03	29,049	2.03	7,669	1.85
Niger	1,706	1.74	17,599	1.23	6,132	1.48
Plateau	1,049	1.07	32,893	2.30	7,107	1.71
Sokoto	281	0.29	9,982	0.70	2,229	0.54
Taraba	606	0.62	14,720	1.03	5,106	1.23
Yobe	461	0.47	7,827	0.55	5,226	1.26
Zamfara	279	0.29	5,222	0.37	1,303	0.31
Southern States	72,418	74.05	935,372	65.51	255,909	61.63
Abia	3,648	3.73	51,209	0.36	13,383	3.22
Akwa Ibom	4,055	4.15	58,135	4.07	14,766	3.55
Anambra	6,318	6.46	77,239	5.41	20,663	4.97
Bayelsa	3,420	3.50	21,130	1.48	5,633	1.36
Cross River	3,353	3.43	29,059	2.03	9,781	2.35
Delta	4,815	4.92	78,126	5.47	19,576	4.71
Ebonyi	2,466	2.52	31,852	2.23	9,252	2.23
Edo	3,665	3.75	65,513	4.59	17,772	4.28
Ekiti	3,709	3.79	33,909	2.37	11,871	2.86
Enugu	4,819	4.92	68,904	4.83	16,080	3.87
Imo	5,401	5.52	103,724	7.26	24,871	5.99
Lagos	2,981	3.05	23,833	1.67	6,938	1.67
Ogun	7,214	7.38	59,824	4.19	18,948	4.56
Ondo	5,117	5.23	53,572	3.75	16,490	3.97
Osun	5,518	5.64	68,479	4.80	21,304	5.13
Oyo	4,259	4.35	70,382	4.93	17,196	4.14
Rivers	1,660	1.70	40,482	2.84	11,385	2.74
Others			4,474	0.31	1547	0.37

Table 3: Top Federal Ministerial and Extra-Ministerial Positions, 2011

Zones	Grade Levels						Total
	10	11	13	14	15	17	
North Central	5,162	14	3,749	2,669	2,078	540	14,212
Benue	858	9	576	404	291	100	2,238
Kogi	1,487	2	1,083	829	600	168	4,169
Kwara	852	2	642	449	352	95	2,392
Nasarawa	442	0	311	224	152	28	1,157
Niger	760	0	558	342	306	71	2,031
Plateau	763	1	579	421	377	78	2,219
North East	2,107	0	1,637	1,175	949	262	6,130
Adamawa	582	0	420	317	304	67	1,690
Bauchi	283	0	191	148	108	35	765
Borno	431	0	328	238	188	49	1,234
Gombe	387	0	311	185	152	56	1,091
Taraba	287	0	192	158	94	22	753
Yobe	207	0	195	129	103	33	667
North West	2,923	0	2,122	1,631	1,182	360	8,218
Jigawa	235	0	215	125	131	40	746
Kaduna	829	0	631	476	303	76	2,315
Kano	790	0	583	389	328	127	2,217
Katsina	404	0	257	256	178	57	1,152
Kebbi	309	0	225	194	128	30	886
Sokoto	193	0	110	76	67	10	456
Zamfara	163	0	101	115	47	20	446
South East	5,233	2	2,967	2,639	2,120	630	13,591
Abia	996	0	609	442	347	110	2,504
Anambra	1,292	2	1,109	816	751	292	4,269
Ebonyi	284	0	201	160	74	21	740
Enugu	856	0	491	345	247	49	1,988
Imo	1,805	0	1,048	876	701	158	4,588
South West	5,809	13	3,799	2,891	2,245	682	12,439
Ekiti	816	2	566	385	329	105	2,203
Lagos	550	1	395	332	247	76	1,601
Ogun	1,438	4	877	675	527	168	3,689
Ondo	960	1	565	453	352	93	2,424
Osun	1,133	1	739	561	435	116	2,985
Oyo	912	4	657	485	355	124	2,537
South-South	5,263	20	3,413	2,365	2,080	732	13,873
Akwa Ibom	1,077	1	758	485	508	165	2,994
Bayelsa	362	0	216	110	144	59	891
Cross River	585	11	352	269	189	47	1,453
Delta	1,301	6	866	623	477	179	3,452
Edo	1,397	2	967	651	600	213	3,830
Rivers	541	0	254	227	162	60	1,241

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2016, p.79)